The 24 questions lawmakers asked University of Michigan about biological smuggling cases

ANN ARBOR, Mich. – Lawmakers have launched an investigation into the University of Michigan after three Chinese nationals were accused of smuggling biological material into the United States.

Republican U.S. Reps. John Moolenaar, chairman of the Select Committee on China, and Tim Walberg, chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, along with Republican Rep. Brian Babin, of Texas, who is the chairman of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, sent a letter to the university over their concerns about how this alleged smuggling was connected to research labs at the University of Michigan.

The committees found that Yunqing Jian, 33, and her boyfriend, Zunyong Liu, 34, citizens of the People’s Republic of China, conducted research under U of M professors who received funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF).

“It is our position that Chinese researchers tied to the PRC defense research and industrial base have no business participating in U.S. taxpayer-funded research with clear national security implications—especially those related to dangerous biological materials," the committee chairmen wrote in the letter.

Previous Coverage: Chinese researchers remain in jail after being charged in separate biological smuggling cases

Jian allegedly worked as a postdoctoral fellow in a lab led by U of M professors Ping He and Libo Shan, while Liu co-authored publications with the two professors and was also listed as a postdoctoral fellow in their lab.

Jian and Liu are facing charges of conspiracy, smuggling goods into the United States, false statements, and visa fraud after they allegedly smuggled a fungus called Fusarium graminearum into the U.S. through Detroit Metro Airport.

The fungus is classified as a potential agroterrorism weapon, according to a release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It can cause significant crop damage through a condition called “head blight,” affecting wheat, barley, maize and rice.

The letter says that NIH and NSF data show that the two professors have received over $9.6 million in government funding since 2010.

Within the same week that charges against Jian and Liu were announced, a third person, Chengxuan Han, also a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, was charged in a separate smuggling case involving the university.

She was charged with smuggling and making false statements after she allegedly sent four packages from China containing concealed biological material to two individuals who work in a laboratory at the U of M.

Due to this, the lawmakers asked the NIH and NSF to conduct a review of grants related to the smuggling cases.

They are also asking the university to answer 24 questions and provide documents related to “its oversight, compliance practices, and any internal reviews related to those individuals,” according to a release Select Committee on China.

Here are the questions:

1. How are you preventing unauthorized access to labs, including unauthorized access granted by a party that has authorized access? Please provide all documentation related to approved access to laboratory equipment and spaces, including records of issuance of keys or access codes, access approval documentation, or any mandatory lab safety or training certificates for the laboratory spaces utilized by Professor He, Professor Shan, Liu, Jian, and Han.
2. Were Liu, Jian, and Han listed as covered individuals on any disclosure forms or grant proposal documents certified by UM and submitted to either NSF or NIH? Please provide all documents and disclosure forms for grants supporting research conducted by Professors He and Shan?
3. How often has UM updated disclosures requirements or attestations for active awards funded by NSF and NIH?
4. Does UM share due diligence reports on faculty with federal agencies? If so, how?
5. Does UM have any knowledge about whether or why Professor Shan, Professor He, or any other UM faculty asked visiting researchers to obtain biohazardous materials? Does UM require documentation or approval to bring biohazardous material onto campus?
6. What safeguards does UM have in place with regards to visiting researchers, like Han, who fall outside of the scope of required research security disclosures?
7. Did any intellectual property derive from research conducted by Professors He and Shan at UM?
8. Does UM conduct compliance, monitoring, and additional due diligence on faculty during their employment?
9. Does UM have the necessary language support capabilities when conducting due diligence? Much of the information that shows ties, affiliations, grants, contracts, awards, etc., are in the Chinese vernacular and necessary to uncover when conducting due diligence.
10. Please conduct a full review of Professors He and Shan’s activities in relation to university policies and federal grant requirements.
11. What research did Professors He and Shan conduct at UM? Please provide all foreign gifts and contracts documentation associated with Professors He and Shan.
12. Could any of the awards to UM Professors He and Shan be used to develop bioweapons capabilities?
13. What steps are being taken to ensure fundamental research at UM is not being utilized to create bioweapons?
14. Did any federal awards pay for any travel expenses or accommodations, including stipends, for Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu? If yes, to where?
15. Did Professors Shan and He travel to China during the period of performance of their grants while Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu worked with them?
16. Did UM know that Professors He and Shan had dual affiliations in the past or investigated whether they still had dual affiliations for more recent grants?
17. How are dual appointments handled at UM—particularly if they are with a non-U.S. institution such as China?
18. What are the consequences at UM of incomplete or incorrect disclosures by faculty regarding foreign relationships?
19. Does UM coordinate with federal agencies regarding faculty foreign relationships or potential security concerns?
20. What steps are you taking to protect UM research from the PRC’s targeting of foreign expertise, technology, and ‘know-how’ in support of its national technology, economic, and military goals?
21. Has UM established a research security program office that meets the requirements outlined in July 2024 memorandum titled Guidelines for Research Security Programs at Covered Institutions?
22. Did the previous administration’s delay in releasing the congressionally-mandated guidance prevent UM from instituting policies that would have prevented the research security incidents described above?
23. Was UM contacted by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) regarding potential threats to its research facilities?
24. How often does the IC share information about threats with UM?

Twenty-five lawmakers, including the three chairmen, signed the letter.

The University of Michigan released the following statement when asked about the letter:

“As one of the world’s leading public research institutions, the University of Michigan is dedicated to advancing knowledge, solving critical and consequential problems and improving nearly every facet of the human experience. We condemn any actions that violate federal law, threaten national security, or otherwise undermine the university’s critical public mission. We will continue to cooperate with federal law enforcement in its ongoing investigation and prosecution. We are working to answer the questions raised in the letter from members of Congress. And we will continue to take institution-wide actions to ensure that our vital research enterprise complies with both university policy and federal law.”   

Kay Jarvis, Director of Public Affairs, University of Michigan